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John S. Howe
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Abstract:
In this paper we examine the market reaction—price and volume—to
the appearance of a firm in the Who’s News column of The Wall Street
Journal. We differentiate between those firms whose articles are accompanied
by a picture of an executive and a control set of firms whose articles on the
same day are not accompanied by a picture. The results show a more
pronounced market reaction to the “cum picture” articles, consistent with the
incomplete information theory of Merton [1987] and the heuristic-based
familiarity hypothesis. There is no evidence of significant long-run abnormal
performance for the sample firms.
Keywords: Familiarity bias, Event study, Wall Street Journal

Introduction
Recent empirical evidence suggests that in many circumstances
investors choose stocks based on behavioral heuristics and familiarity
instead of rational strategies such as hedging and diversification. Most
of the recent literature on the effect of familiarity on the stock
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selection process may be considered an evolution of Merton’s [1987]
classic paper on market equilibrium and incomplete information.
Merton posits that an investor knows only a small portion of the total
number of securities available in the market. More recently, Odean
[1999] argues that investors cannot analyze the entire security
population and thus trade securities that for some reason draw their
attention. Barber and Odean [2006] provide evidence that individual
investors are more likely to buy stocks that receive media coverage.
Kaniel, Starks and Vasudevan [2006] find that news coverage can
have a greater effect on mutual fund flow than the fund’s most recent
performance.
Consistent with Merton’s model, Huberman and Regev [2001]
present a case that suggests that investors tend to trade on
information that provides familiarity but is not “new” news. When the
New York Times presented on its front page an article about
Entremed’s research on a new drug that could potentially cure cancer,
its stock rose 430% in one day, even though the news had been
divulged in Nature and in various newspapers more than five months
earlier.1
The tendency of investors to purchase stocks with which they
are familiar is known as familiarity bias. Two causes of familiarity are
proximity (Ivkovic and Weisbenner [2005], Loughran and Schultz
[2005], Huberman [2001], Benartzi 2001]) and brand recognition
(Frieder and Subrahmanyam [2005], Grullon, Kanatas and Weston
[2003]).
Massa and Simonov [2005] distinguish between heuristic-based
familiarity (also called “pure familiarity”) and information-based
familiarity. Heuristic-based familiarity is consistent with psychology
studies that show that the saliency bias affects individuals who are
interpreting data and making decisions. This bias is the propensity to
rely on information that is salient or often mentioned while ignoring
information that is equally important but less visible. Alternatively,
information-based familiarity is based on the assumption that
investors buy and hold those securities about which they have enough
information. Massa and Simonov [2005] state that “the portfolio
information under information-based familiarity is observationally
equivalent to that under exogenous portfolio constraints as information
Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 2008): pg. 107-116. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

2

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

about a stock affects investment decision by altering the perceived
expected pay-off in a rational portfolio decision.”
In this paper we test the validity of the heuristic-based
familiarity hypothesis by making use of the laboratory provided by the
Who’s News section of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Who’s News is a
daily column of the WSJ that presents articles related to changes in
management of U.S. firms.2 Figure 1 shows a typical Who’s News
column. Frequently, Who’s News columns feature a picture of a top
corporate manager who is the focus of one of the articles. Since the
presence of a picture increases the familiarity that individual investors
perceive regarding a particular stock but provides no information, this
study allows us to analyze the impact of heuristic-based familiarity on
stock selection without the confounding presence of information-based
familiarity.
Our analysis shows that firms that are the subject of a Who’s
News article with a picture enjoy positive and significant abnormal
short-horizon returns and abnormal turnover around the article date
when compared to firms that are covered by Who’s News articles
without a picture. These results persist even after controlling for
differences in ex-ante visibility and information content of the news
between firms in articles with picture and firms in articles without
picture. We find no evidence of significant long-run abnormal
performance for the sample firms. Our results are consistent with the
heuristic-based familiarity hypothesis and support the presence of the
saliency bias in investment decisions.

Data Selection
Sample
We form our sample by selecting public firms that are the
subject of a Who’s News article with a picture between January 1996
and December 1998. In this three-year interval, this column appears
745 times. Of these 745 columns, 185 (25%) contain at least one
picture, and fewer than 5% of them contain two or more pictures.
Because some of the articles accompanied by a picture discuss two
firms, the initial sample size is 222. We eliminate from the sample four
nonprofit organizations and 38 firms that are not available on the
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CRSP database at the time of the article. Of the remaining 187 firms,
38 firms are covered by more than one article. We use the firm’s first
appearance as the event date. After removing second and third
appearances, the final sample consists of 119 CRSP firms and 114
Compustat firms.

Matching Firms
We create two control samples. To construct the first control
sample (Control 1), we select for each sample firm a control firm
mentioned in the same day’s Who’s News column but without a
picture. Among these potential control firms, we choose the firm that
is covered in an article of size comparable to the article with picture.3
This matching strategy allows us to isolate the effect of the
presence of a picture from the effect of the informational content of
the article as proxied by article size. Since not all Who’s News columns
present an article without a picture of similar size to the one with a
picture, we cannot pair all the sample firms with matching firms. Of
the 119 sample firms, we are able to match 60 of them.
To construct the second control sample (Control 2), we match
the articles with a picture with articles without a picture, independent
of article size. Control 2 contains all the firms of Control 1 plus another
62, a total of 112 firms. The 7 sample firms that do not have a match
are in a Who’s News column that presents only their article.
Control 1 is a more precise control sample since the firms are
matched by article size and the size of the Who’s News article may be
related to the importance of the information contained. The drawback
of Control 1 is the small sample size. Control 2 is a larger sample but
62 firms out of 112 are not matched by article size.

Sample and Control Firms’ Characteristics
In this study we measure the effect of the visibility generated by
a picture on stock returns and turnover. However, the Wall Street
Journal might preferentially assign a picture to a firm that is highly
visible ex-ante. Therefore it is important to identify this possible
source of endogeneity and to control for it. Firm characteristics that
Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 2008): pg. 107-116. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

4

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

are potentially related to ex-ante visibility are firm size, market-tobook ratio, firm age, and past stock performance. We measure firm
size as the market value of equity, calculate the market-to-book ratio
by dividing the market value of equity by the book value of equity,
measure firm age as the number of years since the CRSP listing
In Table 1 we present the means, medians, and differences of
means and medians for the sample, Control 1, and Control 2 firms.
Control firms are significantly smaller than sample firms and
significantly underperform compared to sample firms. The mean
(median) market capitalization for the sample firms is $18.1 billion
($7.1 billion), while the mean (median) market capitalization of
Control 1 and Control 2 firms is $3.5 billion and $7.3 billion ($1.1
billion and $1.3 billion). The mean (median) abnormal stock return of
the sample firms for the year preceding the article is 0.19%
(−2.77%), while the mean (median) abnormal stock return of Control
1 and Control 2 firms is −13.86% and −13.74% (−15.06% and
−15.65%).
Even though the t-tests of the means and the Wilcoxon tests of
the medians do not present any significant difference in age and
market-to-book between the sample and the control firms, the
significant differences in size and past performance suggest that the
WSJ is more likely to assign a picture to a firm that is more visible exante and perform better (i.e., characterized by larger market
capitalization and higher abnormal returns). We control for our proxies
of ex-ante visibility in the event study regressions presented later.

Event Studies
Returns
We calculate the daily abnormal returns for a single firm (𝐴𝑅)𝑖𝑡
by subtracting the return of each matching firm (or market index)
from the daily return of each sample firm. We obtain the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) by averaging the daily abnormal returns and
then adding the daily averages over the event period of interest. This
method, analogous to the one applied by Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau
[2001], is based on the assumption that the stock portfolio is
rebalanced every period to equally weight each security.
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We compute t-statistics to assess the statistical significance of
the CARs by using the Brown and Warner [1985] dependence
adjustment method with a holdout period that goes from the trading
day −30 to the trading day −16:

𝑚

𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡 /√𝜎 2 ∗ 𝑁
𝑡=𝑖
Where 𝑖 is the first day of the event period under analysis, 𝑚 is
the last day of the event period under analysis, 𝑁 is the number of
trading days of the event period, and 𝜎 2 is the variance of the
abnormal returns of the holdout period.
Table 2 shows the event study return results. The cumulative
returns for the sample firms are positive and significant for all event
periods examined. The cumulative abnormal returns calculated by
subtracting the CRSP value-weighted index from the sample firm
returns are significant at the 1% level in the five days (2.35%) and
three days (1.77%) around the event date.
The day before the WSJ article is possibly the day in which the
firm announces a change in management and occasionally other
significant news; in this case, the return of day −1 reflects the market
reaction to this information. To control for this issue, we report the
CAR for day 0 to day +1. The CAR for these two days (0.80%) is
positive and significant at the 5% level.
Removing the return of day −1 does not completely eliminate
the confounding effect of information contained in the article and does
not control for the increased familiarity that comes with appearing in
the WSJ. To examine the effect of the picture independent of any
associated information, we calculate the abnormal returns by
subtracting the returns of the control firms from the returns of the
sample firms. When we use Control 1, the CAR is still positive and
significant at the 1% level for the five and three days around the
article and positive at the 10% level for the two days starting from the
article day. When we calculate the CARs using Control 2, the returns
are positive and significant at the 10% level for the five and three days
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around the article and positive but not significant for the two days
starting from the article day.
Overall the results presented in Table 2 show firms that are the
subject of an article with a picture enjoy higher abnormal returns
around the event day than firms that are the subject of a similar
article without a picture. This evidence supports the heuristic-based
familiarity hypothesis.
The intermediate term cumulative abnormal returns for the first
month after the article (from trading day 0 to trading day +21), the
first two months after the article (from trading day 0 to trading day
+42), and the first four months after the article (from trading day 0 to
trading day +84) suggest that the increase in value attributable to the
picture is not permanent. The cumulative abnormal returns are not
significantly different from zero for the periods (+2, +15), (0, +42),
and (0, +84). However, when we subtract the returns of Control 1
firms form the returns of sample firms (e.g., “Sample – Control 1”),
the intermediate term returns from day 0 to +42 and from day 0 to
+84 are larger than the event return of day 0 to +1 (2.11% and
2.09% versus 1.43%). This intermediate term evidence partially
suggests the presence of a picture might have in some cases a lasting
impact on firm value for at least four months after the article. We
provide evidence on long–run performance (i.e., three-year buy-andhold abnormal returns) in Table 6.

Returns Controlling for Ex-ante Visibility and Article
Content
As shown in Table 1, larger firms and firms that perform better
are more likely to be selected by the WSJ for an article with picture.
Moreover, it is possible that the WSJ chooses to displays pictures of
firms that experience favorable news. In the OLS regressions
presented in Table 3 we control for the firm-characteristic differences
and the possible article content differences between sample and
control firms.
The dependent variable of our regressions is the difference in
cumulative abnormal returns for the (0, +1) period between sample
firms and control firms. The independent variables related to ex-ante
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visibility (i.e., firm characteristics) are the difference between the
logarithm of the market capitalization of sample firms and control
firms (Size diff), the difference between the market-to-book ratio of
sample firms and control firms (MB diff), the difference between the
logarithm of the years since the CRSP listing date of sample firms and
control firms (Age diff), and the difference between the abnormal
cumulative stock return for the year preceding the article of sample
firms and control firms (Past_Perf diff). The independent variables
related to the information content of the article are three indicator
variables (Event diff, Position diff, Event_CEO diff). Event diff is equal
to one (minus one) if the article relative to the sample firm is about a
positive (negative) event and the article relative to the control firm is
about a negative (positive) event, and it is equal to zero if both articles
are about positive or negative events. Positive events comprise
promotions and new hirings; negative events comprise dismissals,
resignations, hospitalizations, and indictments. Position diff is equal to
one (minus one) if the article relative to the sample firm is about an
executive in a higher (lower) hierarchical position than the executive
presented in the article relative to the control firm, and it is equal to
zero if the executives presented in the sample and control firm articles
occupy the same position in their companies.4 Event_CEO diff is equal
to Event diff if the sample or control firm article focuses on the CEO of
the company, and zero otherwise. Event_CEO diff allows us to jointly
control for the executive position and the event described in the
article.
Table 3 shows that, after controlling for our ex-ante visibility
and information content proxies, the (0, +1) cumulative abnormal
returns of sample firms are 1.1–1.2% higher than the cumulative
abnormal returns of Control 2 firms and 2.1– 2.2% higher than the
cumulative abnormal returns of Control 1 firms. The intercepts of all
regressions are statistically significant at the 10% level. The results of
Table 3 show the presence of a picture in the Who’s News article has a
statistically significant positive effect on event returns above and
beyond the effect on returns due to higher ex-ante visibility of firms
cum-picture, as proxied by size, market-to-book, age, and past
performance. Moreover, the results of Table 3 show the possible
difference in the news between articles with and without pictures is not
what drives the significant difference in abnormal returns.
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Turnover
To calculate the abnormal turnover around the article date we
adopt the method suggested by Campbell and Wasley [1996]. The
initial measure of daily turnover for each sample stock ( 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ) is the
daily ratio between number of shares traded multiplied by 100 and
shares outstanding. To remove the skewness that characterizes
turnover, we log-transform our raw measure of turnover after the
addition of a constant of 0.000255.5
We calculate abnormal turnover using the market model:

𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑇𝑚,𝑡 )

(1)

where we obtain 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 using ordinary least squares

estimation. We measure market volume for a given day 𝑡 (𝑇𝑚,𝑡 ) as
the equally-weighted average of

𝑇𝑖,𝑡 for all the securities covered by

CRSP in any given day. We apply the same procedure for the sample
firms, Control 1 firms, and Control 2 firms.
Table 4 presents the univariate tests on abnormal turnover for
the day of the article and the two-day period starting from the day of
the article (0, +1). Both results for day 0 and (0, +1) window show
that the sample firms experience significant abnormal turnover. The
mean abnormal turnover of the entire sample is 18.98% for day 0 and
16.15% for the (0, +1) interval; both turnover measures are
significant at the 1% level.
The abnormal turnover of the Control 1 and Control 2 firms for
day 0 is also positive and significant but of lower magnitude than the
sample firms (9.50% and 6.26%). The abnormal turnover for the (0,
+1) interval is significant for the Control 2 firms but not for the Control
1 firms.
The results of Table 4 also show that the sample firms
experience significant abnormal turnover even when compared to the
control firms. The t-tests of the difference between the abnormal
turnover of the sample firms and the control firms (both Control 1 and
Control 2) indicate that even controlling for the turnover of the control
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firms, the abnormal turnover of the sample firms around the article
date is positive and significant. The difference between the abnormal
turnover of the sample firms and the Control 1 firms is 6.95%
(significant at the 10% level) for day 0 and 9.77% (significant at the
5% level) for days (0, +1). Similarly, the difference between the
abnormal turnover of the sample firms and the Control 2 firms is
12.45% (significant at the 1% level) for day 0 and 11.40% (significant
at the 1% level) for days (0, +1).
Figure 2 shows the average turnover over the six months
around the article for the sample firms, the Control 1 firms, and the
Control 2 firms. To calculate the daily average turnover, we divide the
turnover of stocks traded on NASDAQ by two to correct for the double
counting of NASDAQ stocks. The figure shows that the sample firms
are characterized by higher turnover than the control firms for the
entire six months around the article. In other words, firms whose
article is accompanied by a picture are more “popular” than firms
whose article is without a picture. However, this issue does not
influence the results in Table 2 because we calculate abnormal
turnover by using the market model; therefore, we control for the
“normal” turnover of each sample and control firm. The figure also
shows that turnover significantly increases around the day of the
article for the sample firms but not for the control firms.6
Overall, our tests of abnormal turnover show that the presence
of a picture in a Who’s News article significantly increases the trading
volume of that company’s stock. Consistent with the heuristic-based
familiarity hypothesis, this result maintains its significance even when
we control for the information contained in the article.

Turnover Controlling for Ex-ante Visibility and Article
Content
To verify that the abnormal turnover at the time of the articles
is not exclusively motivated by ex-ante visibility or the information
content of the articles, we estimate OLS regressions with the
difference of abnormal turnover between sample and control firms for
days (0, +1) as dependent variable. As in the regressions presented in
Table 3 the dependent variables are proxies for ex-ante visibility (Size
diff, MB diff, Age diff, and Past_Perf diff) and the information content
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of the article (Event diff, Position diff, and Event_CEO diff). Table 5
presents the results.
Table 5 shows that, after controlling for our ex-ante visibility
and information content proxies, the (0, +1) cumulative abnormal
turnover of sample firms is significantly higher than the cumulative
abnormal returns of Control 2 and Control 1 firms. These results
corroborate the univariate statistics presented in Table 4 and show
that the presence of a picture in the Who’s News article has a
statistically significant positive effect on turnover above and beyond
the effect attributable to higher ex-ante visibility or more positive
news for firms cum-picture.

Long-Term Abnormal Returns
Method
In this section we analyze the long-term abnormal returns of the
sample firms and compare them to the abnormal long-term stock
returns of the control firms to verify if the effect of the picture in
Who’s News articles persist in the long-term. Specifically, we examine
whether long-term returns in the three years following the articles are
positive and significantly different from zero. Using the CRSP daily
database, we consider each sample firm from the month that follows
the date of the article until the earlier of either its delisting month, or
the third year anniversary from the month of its appearance on the
Who’s News column.
As noted by Fama [1998] and Mitchell and Stafford [2000], the
buy-and-hold method does not account for cross-sectional dependence
in returns. We address this issue by estimating three-year abnormal
returns using the calendar-time portfolio method advocated by Fama
[1998].
For each calendar month in our sample period, we form a
portfolio of the sample firms that were the subject of a Who’s News
article with picture during the last 36 months. We exclude those
months with fewer than 10 firms in the portfolio. We value-weight the
returns of the stocks in each monthly portfolio.7 We calculate calendartime abnormal returns using the correction proposed by Shumway
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[1997] and Shumway and Warther [1999] to control for the returns of
firms that delist for performance reason (i.e., bankruptcy or failure to
meet capital requirements) during the period of interest. We impose
−30% as the last return for NYSE and AMEX firms and −55% as the
last return for NASDAQ firms that delist for performance reasons
during the three years following the article. We then regress the
monthly portfolio excess returns on the three Fama and French [1993]
factors.
We repeat the same procedure to calculate the portfolio
abnormal long-term returns of Control 1 and Control 2 firms. To
investigate if the difference of the portfolio abnormal returns between
the sample firms and the control firms, we regress the difference in
the monthly portfolio excess returns between the sample and Control 1
and between the sample and Control 2 on the three Fama and French
[1993] factors. We present the results in Table 6.
The calendar-time regression indicates that the average
abnormal monthly return for the full sample is 0.84%, which is
statistically significant at the 1% level.8 The corresponding 3-year
abnormal return obtained by earning the intercept for 36 months is
35.1% [(1 + 0.0084)36 − 1].
The 3-year abnormal return for the Control 1 is 59.88% and
statistically significant, while the 3-year abnormal return for the
Control 2 firms is 20.87% but not statistically significant.
The difference of the 3-year abnormal returns between the
sample portfolio and the Control 1 portfolio is negative (−9.27%) but
not significant. Alternatively, the difference of the 3-year abnormal
returns between the sample portfolio and the Control 2 portfolio is
positive (14.88%) but not significant. The lack of significance in the
difference of the long-term abnormal returns between the sample and
the control firms show that the effect of the picture in Who’s News
articles does not have a long-term effect on stock performance.

Conclusion
Recent empirical literature shows that investors focus on stocks
of which they are most aware. The effect of familiarity on the stock
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selection process can be a consequence of behavioral biases or of
differential access to information. We test the effect of familiarity on
the stock selection process by analyzing the market reaction to the
appearance of firms on the Who’s News column of The Wall Street
Journal. Focusing on the articles accompanied by a picture, our test
removes the informational dimension of familiarity and allows the
analysis of the effect of the saliency bias on the stock selection process
in isolation.
We find that the “cum-picture” articles are accompanied by a
higher short-horizon price reaction and higher turnover than articles
“ex-picture.” These results maintain their significance even after
controlling for proxies of ex-ante visibilities and information content of
the articles. We find no evidence of long-horizon abnormal returns for
the sample firms. Our results are consistent with the findings of
Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zinman [2005], who
analyze the effect of the presence of a photograph in loan solicitation
letters. They show that a photo on a solicitation letter has more impact
on the “take up” rate than does a lower interest rate.
Overall, our results show that familiarity has an effect on the
stock selection process even when it is not associated with
information. Our study is consistent with the heuristic-based familiarity
hypothesis. Even though in many circumstances familiarity is
associated with an informationally efficient selection of securities
(Massa and Simonov [2006], Ivkovic and Weisbenner [2005]),
behavioral heuristics have significant influence on the stock selection
process.
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Notes
1. On a related note, Antweiler and Frank (2004) analyze messages in
Internet chat rooms regarding stocks. They find a significant relation
between message activity and trading volume and message activity and
return volatility. Tetlock [2007] studies the interactions between the
media and the stock market using daily content from the “Abreast of the
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Market” Wall Street Journal column. He finds that high media pessimism
predicts downward pressure on market prices followed by a reversion to
fundamentals.
2. The Who’s News column was daily over our sample period. It became
weekly on October 17, 2000, and resumed a daily periodicity in 2006.
3. Who’s News articles belong to either one of two groups depending on size.
Some of the articles consist of several paragraphs while others consist of
only one paragraph. Since all the articles with pictures have more than
one paragraph, we match the sample firms with firms covered in “multiparagraph” articles without pictures.
4. The hierarchical order from the highest to the lowest position is: (1) CEO
and chairman; (2) CEO; (3) chairman; (4) CFO, COO, president, or a
combination of the three positions; and (5) vice-president, regional
president, other top executive, or director.
5. The addition of the constant prevents taking the logarithm of zero in days
of zero trading volume (Cready and Ramanan [1991]).
6. As a robustness check, in an unreported test we regress the difference of
abnormal turnover between sample and control firms on the difference of
our ex-ante visibility proxies (size, market-to-book, age, and past
performance) between sample and control firms. The intercepts of these
regressions are positive and statistically significant.
7. The results do not significantly change when we weight the returns
equally.
8. We calculate standard errors using the quadratic spectral kernel
recommended by Andrews [1991] to correct for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation.
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Figure 1

Some images have been removed
from this version of the article due to
third-party copyright restrictions.
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Figure 2: Turnover around Article Dates

Note: This figure shows the average turnover of the 119 sample firms (‘tur’), of the 60
Control 1 firms (‘tur control1’), and of the 114 Control 2 firms (‘tur control2’) in the
126 trading days around the article date (day 0).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Ex-ante Visibility

Note: This table presents univariate statistics on ex-ante visibility characteristics for
sample firms, Control 1 firms, and Control 2 firms. We measure firm size as the
market value of equity, we calculate the market-to-book ratio by dividing the market
value of equity by the book value of equity, we measure firm age as the number of
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years since the CRSP listing date, and we measure past performance as the abnormal
cumulative stock return for the year preceding the article. The t-values refer to twosample t-tests of the mean, and the p-values refer to Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney nonparametric tests for the median. ***, **, and * indicate two-sided significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 2: Event Returns

Note: This table presents the percent cumulative returns for a sample of firms that are
the subject of Who’s News articles with picture in year 1996, 1997, or 1998. The
cumulative returns are calculated for several event periods centered on the date of the
article. The first row presents the raw cumulative returns for the sample firms. The
other columns present the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) when the CRSP valueweighted index returns, or the control firms’ returns, are subtracted from the sample
firms’ returns. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate
two-sided significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 3: Event Study – OLS Regressions

Note: This table presents the coefficients of OLS regressions in which the dependent
variable is the difference of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the
article day and the following day (interval [0,1]) between the sample firms and the
matched control firms. Size diff is the difference between the logarithm of the market
capitalization of the sample firms and control firms. MB diff is the difference between
the market-to-book ratio of the sample firms and control firms. Age diff is the
difference between the logarithm of the years since the CRSP listing date of the
sample firms and control firms. Past_Perf diff is the difference between the abnormal
cumulative stock return for the year preceding the article of the sample firms and
control firms. Event diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the article relative to the sample firm is
about a positive (negative) event and the article relative to the control firm is about a
negative (positive) event, and it is equal to 0 if both articles are about positive or
negative events. Positive events comprise promotions and new hirings, negative
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events comprise dismissals, resignations, hospitalizations, and indictments. Position
diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the article relative to the sample firm is about an executive in
a higher (lower) hierarchical position than the executive presented in the article
relative to the control firm, and it is equal to 0 if the executives presented in the
sample and control firm articles occupy the same position in their companies.
Event_CEO diff is equal to Event diff if the sample or control firm article focuses on the
CEO of the company, and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
***, **, and * indicate one-sided significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 4: Abnormal Turnover

Note: This table shows the results of univariate tests on abnormal turnover. The initial
measure of daily turnover for each sample stock ( 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ) is the daily ratio between
number of shares traded multiplied by 100 and shares outstanding. We log-transform
this raw measure of turnover after the addition of a constant of 0.000255. We
calculate abnormal turnover using the market model: 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑇𝑚,𝑡 ) where 𝛼𝑖
and 𝛽𝑖 are obtained via ordinary least squares estimation. The market volume measure
for a given day 𝑡 (𝑇𝑚,𝑡 ) is measured as the equally weighted average of 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 for all the
securities covered by CRSP in any given day. We apply the same procedure for the
sample firms, Control 1 firms, and Control 2 firms. The sample is formed by 119 CRSP
firms that are the subject of a Who’s News article with picture between January 1996
and December 1998. The 60 Control 1 firms are the subjects of Who’s News articles
Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 2008): pg. 107-116. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge)
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

20

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

without picture of size comparable with the size of the articles with picture of the
sample firms. The 112 Control 2 firms are the subjects of Who’s News articles without
picture of size of any size. The seven sample firms that do not have a match are the
ones that are in a Who’s News column that present only their article. Panel A reports
the results for the three days around the article date (event days –1, 0, and +1). ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.

Table 5: Abnormal Turnover – OLS Regressions

Note: This table presents the coefficients of OLS regressions in which the dependent
variable is the difference of abnormal turnover for the article day and the following day
(interval [0,1]) between the sample firms and the matched control firms. Size diff is
the difference between the logarithm of the market capitalization of the sample firms
and control firms. MB diff is the difference between the market-to-book ratio of the
sample firms and control firms. Age diff is the difference between the logarithm of the
years since the CRSP listing date of the sample firms and control firms. Past_Perf diff
is the difference between the abnormal cumulative stock return for the year preceding
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the article of the sample firms and control firms. Event diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the
article relative to the sample firm is about a positive (negative) event and the article
relative to the control firm is about a negative (positive) event, and it is equal to 0 if
both articles are about positive or negative events. Positive events comprise
promotions and new hirings, negative events comprise dismissals, resignations,
hospitalizations, and indictments. Position diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the article relative
to the sample firm is about an executive in a higher (lower) hierarchical position than
the executive presented in the article relative to the control firm, and it is equal to 0 if
the executives presented in the sample and control firm articles occupy the same
position in their companies. Event_CEO diff is equal to Event diff if the sample or
control firm article focuses on the CEO of the company, and 0 otherwise. The tstatistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate one-sided significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.

Table 6: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns

Note: This table presents calendar time portfolio abnormal returns obtained by using
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model: 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡 . We correct the standard errors of the regressions for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation using the quadratic spectral kernel as suggested by Andrews
[1991]. The implied abnormal return (“implied AR”) is the estimated average buy-andhold return obtained from earning the intercept return for 36 months [(1 +

𝛼
100

)

36

− 1].

We obtain the calendar time portfolio abnormal returns using Shumway [1997]
correction for firms that delist for performance reasons. The t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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